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Segregation, Choice Based Letting and Social Housing: 
How Housing Policy Can Affect the Segregation Process
* 
 
In this chapter we investigate the process of ethnic minority segregation in English social 
housing. Successive governments have expressed a commitment to the contradictory aims 
of providing greater choice – through the introduction of choice based letting – for 
households accessing an increasingly marginalised social housing sector whilst also 
expressing a determination to create more mixed communities and neighbourhoods. We 
consider the concept of choice in the context of a heavily residualised social housing sector, 
arguing that, for social housing tenants at least, the concept of real choice is a misnomer. We 
draw on research that has utilised unique administrative data and analysed the moves of all 
entrants into and movers within the social renting sector over a ten year period in England. 
The conclusion is that the introduction of choice based letting has influenced the residential 
outcomes of ethnic minorities and resulted in highly structured neighbourhood sorting that 
has segregated minority populations into the least desirable neighbourhoods of English cities. 
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Many  of    the  chapters  in  this  volume  report  on  the  ways  in  which  segregation  can  be 
measured  (see  for  example  Johnston,  this  volume),  or  the  degree  to  which  specific 
populations are segregated in the residential or even school context (see for example Harris, 
this volume). At the heart of these chapters is a discussion about segregation indices either as 
a  means  through  which  the  state  of  segregation  can  be  measured  and  reported  or  as  a 
problematic indicator that requires careful consideration and deployment. This chapter takes a 
different approach by investigating neighbourhood sorting. The study of segregation is, at one 
level, the study of variance in neighbourhood characteristics. That is to say the amount by 
which the population in one place varies compared to the expected mean level of variation. 
Whilst  it is  important  to  identify  where  high  and  low  levels  of  variation  occur,  of  more 
importance  is  the  understanding  of  how  the  variation  occurs  in  the  first  place.  As  a 
consequence, we explicitly explore the dynamic nature of the neighbourhood and the flows of 
households into neighbourhoods of different types of neighbourhoods. This chapter reports 
research investigating the effect of choice based letting (CBL) on how prospective social 
housing tenants sort into dwellings and neighbourhoods and how household choice influences 
the composition of a neighbourhood. CBL was introduced in the early 2000s by the then 
labour  government  in  England  to  enable  social  housing  tenants  to  select  their  property 
moving  away  from  a  landlord  led  allocation  system  through  which  social  housing  had 
previously been let. CBL was also charged with promoting letting in neighbourhoods that 
were traditionally hard to allocate either through reputation or perceived undesirability. A 
focus on these sorting processes within the social housing sector is largely missing in the 
current segregation literature. 
This chapter draws on three literatures. The fist literature is concerned with the issue 
of household residential choice and demonstrates that when households are able to exercise 
choice  over  their  residential  location  they  will,  all  other  being  equal,  choose  to  live  in 
residential environments that are comprised of other households with similar characteristics 
(see Schelling, 1969; Clark, 1991; 1996; Peach, 1998). Of course, choice itself is a luxury 
good, one which some households are better able to execute than others. Real choice can be 
thought of as having the ability to choose a preferred outcome from a set of distinct options. 
However,  even  in  the  owner  occupier  housing  market,  real  choice  rarely  exists.  A  key 
determinant of choice in the residential housing market is finance – the ability to pay for 
access to better neighbourhoods and dwellings is crucial to being able to express one’s own 
choice. Thus, households with limited access to financial resources will be less well placed to 
exercise choice. 
The second literature on which this chapter draws is concerned with the changing role 
of the social housing sector in the United Kingdom. Successive governments in the UK have 
sought to reduce the size of the social housing sector. Through policies such a the right to 
buy, reduction of new social landlord building grants, and through the introduction of mixed 
tenure communities replacing large social housing estates, the proportion of the population 
living in the social housing sector has fallen from 32% in 1971 to 18% in 2009. Clearly, 
against a backdrop of a falling tenure mode, the notion of choice has a very specific meaning, 
and we enter into a discussion about this below. The third literature on which this chapter is 
based  is  concerned  with  segregation  in  neighbourhoods.  We  briefly  highlight  the  way  in 
which segregation has been portrayed in the academic literature and the concern of the British 
government to the assumed negative effects of concentrations of ethnic minority groups in 
specific spaces within many of the towns and cities. We related this concern to the policy 
context as a means to understand the policy context within which CBL was launched. This 
chapter proceeds as follows. First we identify key themes from the literature outline above 
and  set  out  how  housing  and  neighbourhood  choice  can  lead  to  segregated  outcomes. Following on from this, we discuss the changing nature of social housing in the UK over the 
last  30  years.  These  discussions  are  then  brought  together  when  we  outline  the  policy 
environment that led to the marketization of social housing and the introduction of CBL. 
Second, we discuss two case studies on the effects of CBL on neighbourhood sorting and 




Residential and Tenure Segregation in the UK 
The spatial concentration of ethnic minorities in specific neighbourhoods is of great concern 
to the British Government, and was highlighted as one of the causes of the 2001 Riots in 
several towns and cities in Northern England (Independent Review Team, 2001; Commission 
for  Racial  Equality,  1990;  2004).  The  severity  of  ethnic  and  socio-economic  separation 
within  England  has  been  debated  at  length,  and  terminology  such  as  segregation  and 
ghettoisation has become severely loaded. Using 1991 Census data for the United Kingdom, 
Champion (1996) reported that in England ethnic minorities are spatially dispersed and that 
areas  with  the  highest  concentrations  of  ethnic  minorities  do  not  match  the  image  of 
racialised ‘ghettos’ as known in the USA (see also Peach, 1996; Johnston et al., 2002). In a 
more  recent  analysis  using  the  2001  Census,  the  national  trend  of  dispersion  of  ethnic 
minorities, albeit with pockets of ethnic concentrations, was confirmed by Johnston (2006, 
p.988). Using both 1991 and 2001 Census data, Dorling and Rees (2003) suggested that there 
was evidence at the local authority level of increasing segregation between the white majority 
and ethnic minorities. Using proxy measures, such as access to bathrooms and central heating 
as  indicators  of  socio-economic  status,  Dorling  and  Rees  (2003)  also  point  to  growing 
segregation between housing tenures: “[t]o be growing up in a council house now marks a 
household out geographically far more than it did a decade ago” (p.1301). Concerns have also 
been expressed about the concentration of ethnic minorities in social housing which suggests 
that ethnic minorities are less able than others to satisfy their housing needs in the market 
(Cabinet Office, 2003; Home Office 2001). There is, of course, interaction between socio-
economic  and  ethnic  segregation.  The  proportion  of  ethnic  minorities  in  the  overall 
population  in  England  was  around  9  per  cent  at  the  time  of  the  2001  Census.  Ethnic 
minorities are generally concentrated in large urban areas, and are over represented in social 
housing. On average, 17 per cent of the white population in England lives in social housing 
and 27 per cent of the ethnic minority population lives in social housing (SEH, 2007). 
The selective mobility of residents into and out of neighbourhoods has the potential to 
create and reinforce patterns of deprivation and segregation (Bailey & Livingstone, 2008; 
Van Ham & Feijten, 2008; Feijten & Van Ham, 2009; Van Ham & Clark, 2009). Individual 
preferences  related  to  the  ethnic  composition  of  the  neighbourhood  population,  and  the 
consequent  moving  behaviour  of  these  individuals,  can  cumulate  in  aggregate  to  highly 
segregated neighbourhoods (Schelling, 1969, 1971; see also Clark, 1992; Emerson et  al., 
2001; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi, 2002; Ionnides and Zabel, 2003). Alternatively, the ‘racial proxy 
hypothesis’  argues  that  members  of  the  majority  population  leave  ethnic  concentration 
neighbourhoods not because they have an aversion to living near minority group members 
per se, but because these neighbourhoods are often deprived (Taub et al., 1984; Clark, 1992; 
Harris, 1999; Crowder, 2000). This is partly because some ethnic minority groups are more 
likely to be unemployed and have lower incomes than the majority population, and partly 
because ethnic minorities often end up in low income, deprived and unstable neighbourhoods 
as a result of limited choice on the housing market. 
Simpson  (2004)  has  highlighted  that  to  fully  understand  apparent  neighbourhood 
segregation it is necessary to move beyond issues of selective migration. Using demographic data  for  Bradford,  Simpson  (2004)  reported  that  significant  changes  in  the  relative 
distribution of the South Asian community, relative to rest of the population, was caused by 
natural  population  growth.  Bradford  was  one  of  the  cities  in  the  North  of  England  that 
experienced riots during the summer of 2001, and it is notable that Simpson’s conclusion on 
the causes of segregation was at odds with the government report which focussed on self-
segregation of ethnic minorities through their residential choices (Independent Review Team, 
2001).  The  same  report  does  not  acknowledge  that  ‘self-segregation’  is  often  rooted  in 
poverty  and  deprivation,  and  not  necessarily  the  result  of  real  choice  (Hickman  and 
Robinson, 2006; Robinson, 2005; van Ham and Manley, 2009; Manley and van Ham, 2011). 
 
Social Housing Allocation in the UK 
Housing  allocation  practices  from  as  far  back  as  the  1950s  have  been  linked  to  current 
patterns of ethnic segregation. It was repeatedly shown that housing officers intentionally and 
unintentionally  promoted  segregated  outcomes  by  discriminating  applicants  based  on 
ethnicity  and  socio-economic  background  and  allocated  households  to  dwellings  and 
neighbourhoods  based  on  whether  they  ‘deserved’  a  dwelling,  or  were  ‘suitable’  for  a 
neighbourhood  (Simpson,  1981;  Henderson  &  Karn,  1984;  Clapham  &  Kintrea,  1984; 
Malpass & Murie, 1994; Peach, 1996; Somerville, 2001; Sarre et al., 1989). Prior to the 
1970s social housing in the UK was allocated by housing officers who were able to exercise a 
high degree of discretion in judging whether or not a family ‘deserved’ to live in a property. 
This process was not very transparent and has been acknowledged as a means through which 
ethnic  minority  segregation  was  reproduced  overtime.  From  the  1970s  onwards,  social 
housing in England was allocated following a needs-based system. However, the needs based 
system did not completely democratise the system. In many cases, front-line housing officers 
and local councillors still maintained some discretionary powers (Henderson and Karn 1984; 
Fitzpatrick and Stephens 1999). Needs-based systems were designed to introduce objectivity 
in  the  housing  allocation  process.  Categories  of  reasonable  preference  were  created  and 
enabled  a  mechanism  through  which  groups  competing  for  the  same  properties  could  be 
prioritised. Even after needs-based systems were introduced, research still demonstrated that 
the allocation processes through which tenants gain access to social housing have tended to 
concentrate the most disadvantaged individuals in the least attractive areas (see for example, 
Henderson and Karn 1984; Clapham and Kintrea 1986). This finding this important, as it is 
through the house and therefore by extension the neighbourhood in which individual’s centre 
their lives. In short, where you live has an effect on your ability access to many public and 
private  services,  employment  and  social  opportunities.  As  Pawson  and  Kintrea  noted, 
“housing  processes  have  the  potential  to  be  a  force  for  social  exclusion  by  creating  and 
maintaining social and spatial divisions and thereby providing barriers to jobs, education and 
other services” (2002, p.646). There are a number of competing issues to be considered here. 
Firstly, the allocation systems through which prospective tenants must navigate are set up, in 
many  cases,  not  to  assist  them  to  achieve  the  best  housing  outcome  based  on  their  own 
characteristics  and  desires,  but  to  assist  landlords  to  manage  their  housing  stock  and  the 
demand for properties with varying levels of attractiveness. Research by  Fitzpatrick and 
Pawson (2006), and Mullins and Pawson (2005) has shown that the traditional routes into 
social  housing  restrict  prospective  tenants  in  terms  of  the  type  of  housing,  including  the 
location, available to them. Further restrictions on households exercising choice are apparent 
in the allocation system. When offered properties, households could refuse an offer made, but 
doing so usually led to penalties, including temporary suspension from the housing waiting 
list (Pawson & Watkins, 2007) or even exclusion through one-offer-only policies (Pawson & 
Kintrea, 2002). Of all the factors that can influence the outcome of a move into or within the 
social housing sector the ability to wait is a key driver (Mullins and Pawson 2005; Pawson and Kintrea 2002; Fitzpatrick and Stephens 1999). Fitzpatrick and Pawson noted that “the 
importance of the ‘ability to wait’ in driving spatial polarisation is germane to the potential 
impact  of  the  ‘choice’  agenda”  (2006  p.172).  This  is  especially  true  as  in  cases  where 
households with similar needs bid on the same property, waiting time is often used as a 
means to allocate the dwelling to the household with the longest waiting time. All other 
things being equal, turnover rates are greater in less popular housing and in less popular 
neighbourhoods. As a result, more popular properties and more popular neighbourhood tend 
to become available less often. Households with more urgent housing needs, and with less 
time to wait are less likely to be able to invest time in the search for a new property in a 
popular neighbourhood. This is particularly an issue for new entrants into the social housing 
sector,  accessing  housing  because  of  eviction  or  repossession,  or  other  groups  requiring 
accommodation quickly such as those fleeing domestic violence.  
  In 2001 CBL was introduced to empower people in social housing to make decisions 
over how and where they live (DETR, 2000b, Brown & Yates, 2005; Brown & King, 2005). 
The model for CBL came from the ‘advert’ or ‘supply’ model developed in the late 1980s in 
the city of Delft in the Netherlands (Kullberg, 1997; 2002). The system was designed to 
“open up the letting of social housing” and operates by enabling eligible households to bid on 
a range of properties (Pawson et al., 2006, p.5). In instances where more than one household 
applied to bid on the same property, eligibility is determined using ‘currency’ to rank bidders. 
Currency could include points based on household characteristics (the presence of children) 
and waiting time or housing need bands (Marsh et al., 2004). Within the CBL framework, 
social landlords still have the legal obligation to operate a needs-based allocation system. By 
introducing a quasi-market system into social housing allocation it was hoped that demand 
would be stimulated in  harder to let areas  (Marsh, 2004),  and that households would be 
encouraged to become stakeholders in their neighbourhoods of choice.  
 
Neighbourhood and housing ‘choice’ 
The concept of ‘choice’ in relation to housing and neighbourhoods is often used in policy 
documents and academic literature and frequently has positive connotations. However, the 
concept of ‘choice’ is highly misleading in housing studies: it is unlikely that a household 
behaving  rationally  would  choose  to  live  in  poor  quality  housing  or  a  dangerous 
neighbourhood  (van  Ham,  2012).  Instead,  housing  and  neighbourhood  outcomes  are  the 
result of an interplay between preferences, opportunities and restrictions on the one hand and 
housing stock availability and allocation mechanisms on the other. Real choice is assumed to 
exist when individuals are able to choose a preferred option from a set of distinct alternatives 
(Elster, 1999; Brown and King, 2005). Within the social housing sector it is hardly possible 
to speak of real choice as often there are no real distinct alternatives. Examining housing 
choice is complicated by the fact that housing is a composite good. Housing can be thought 
of in many terms, including size, number of bedrooms, style, quality and relative location. 
However,  none  of  these  aspects  can  be  purchased  individually  and  dwellings  come  as  a 
bundle of goods. This bundle also includes the neighbourhood and access to jobs as well as to 
private and public facilities (van Ham, 2012).   
There  are  substantial  differences  in  the  degree  to  which  choice  can  be  exercised 
between tenures. For instance, those searching in the owner occupied market are likely to be 
able to express a greater degree of choice than those households depending on the social 
housing  sector.  Brown  and  King  (2005)  describe  social  housing  as  a  gift  from  the 
bureaucracy that controls it, as even under CBL the state sets the rules governing which 
households can bid on which properties. 
 
 Housing choice and segregation 
There is a long history of work investigating the role of neighbourhood choice as a driver for 
neighbourhood segregation. The work of Schelling (1969; 1971) is often regarded as the 
starting point of this literature. He argued that many households have a preference for living 
in neighbourhoods with households of similar (ethnic) background and that these preferences 
can lead to highly segregated neighbourhoods. Using empirical data from the United States, 
Clark (1991) demonstrated that the Schelling hypothesis was broadly correct, and that even 
small differences in preferences between ethnic groups with regard to the ethnic composition 
of  neighbourhoods  can  lead  to  highly  segregated  communities  (see  also  Fossett,  2006). 
Similarly, evidence from both Europe and the United States indicates that ethnic segregation 
is primarily driven by own-group preferences held by the majority population. In addition, 
the majority population tends to have the greatest level of resources and, therefore, the ability 
to put these preferences into action. For example, Clark (1991) reports that while whites 
preferred the ethnic mix in their neighbourhood to be at least 80% white, blacks seemed to 
prefer  a  50/50  mix.  Work  from  Sweden  by  Bråmå  (2006)  demonstrated  that  the  most 
immigrant-dense  neighbourhoods  are  truly  multicultural,  making  the  notion  of  voluntary 
ethnic minority clustering unlikely. Ethnic mix preferences (or rather preferences for relative 
homogeneity) by the majority population are apparent at the aggregate level through patterns 
of white avoidance of ethnic minority neighbourhoods. However, whilst Schelling and others 
have emphasised household preference as means to understand residential sorting patterns, 
especially with respect to ethnic minority  concentration in neighbourhoods, other authors 
have highlighted the importance of discrimination within housing markets, either through 
realtors  not  showing  properties  to  families  from  ethnic  minority  backgrounds  or  finance 
companies making credit harder to obtain (see for instance Galster, 1976).  
Studies from various countries have found that ethnic minorities are more likely than 
natives to move to ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. It has been hypothesised that these 
moves to ethnic concentration neighbourhoods are (partly) motivated by the desire to live in 
areas with others who have common life experiences and by the availability of ethnic-specific 
services  (see  Bowes  et  al,  1997).  Other  studies  have  emphasised  the  impact  of  socio-
economic differences between ethnic and non-ethnic groups (e.g. Clark and Ledwith, 2006; 
South and Crowder, 1997; 1998). In Sweden ethnic minorities are overrepresented among the 
lower income groups, and as a result they concentrate in low-cost neighbourhoods. Similar 
evidence  has  been  presented  for  from  the  Netherlands  (see  Bolt  et  al  2008).  Bråmå  and 
Andersson (2005; 2010) have shown that recent immigrants in Sweden initially move to areas 
with high densities of immigrants. When their income improves they are more likely to leave 
these  neighbourhoods  and  move  to  less  ethnically  concentrated  neighbourhoods. 
Discrimination has also been shown to influence neighbourhood ethnic sorting [e.g. Turner et 
al (2002) for the United States], although the extent to which this is valid for Sweden is 
unclear (Bråmå, 2007). 
 
Choice Based Lettings and segregation 
One of the possible negative side effects of a system that promotes household choice, such as 
CBL, is that it could lead to increased levels of segregation, or at the  very least sustain 
current levels of segregation, as households are able to influence where they will live. As the 
debate above highlighted, once households are empowered to express their preferences then 
we would expect that they would seek to live in neighbourhoods that had a majority of other 
residents similar to themselves (as suggested by Schelling, 1971). However, it has also been 
argued that a lack of real choice in CBL, and not self-segregation, might be a cause of social 
and ethnic segregation in neighbourhoods (Pawson & Watkins, 2007; see also van Ham & 
Manley, 2009; Manley and van Ham, 2011). Having real choice means being able to select a preferred  option  from  distinctive  alternatives,  and  the  process  of  CBL  presumes  that 
households  will  act  rationally.  In  social  housing,  a  safety  net  for  those  without  options, 
distinctive alternatives  might not be  available.  Research by Marsh and colleagues (2004) 
showed that tenants, who accessed social housing using CBL, identified a lack of choice as a 
real  problem.  Tenants  stated  that  they  frequently  ended  up  bidding  on  properties  and 
neighbourhoods they deemed to be of sub-standard quality. An essential prerequisite for real 
choice is information (knowledge) about alternatives (see Elster, 1999 as in Brown & King, 
2005). Some social housing applicants using CBL will have more and better information than 
others, either as a result of English language skills (Pawson et al., 2006), skills in using the 
CBL system, time to assess alternatives, or greater knowledge about the local housing market 
and neighbourhoods in their choice set. Ultimately, this will bias the allocation system in 
their favour (Brown & King, 2005). Research in the Netherlands showed that applicants with 
low incomes and those from ethnic minority groups (often overlapping groups) were more 
likely to lack understanding of the CBL system and therefore fared less well in terms of 
housing outcomes (Kullberg, 2002). 
CBL might also lead to segregation because those with urgent housing needs, but 
without priority status, use their choice to bid on the easiest-to-get dwellings which increases 
the likelihood to be accommodated in a less desirable area (van Ham & Manley, 2009). As 
noted above, the ability to wait is crucial in exercising choice. As a result of the above, 
concerns  have  been  expressed  that  CBL  might  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  already 
disadvantaged groups (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). Ethnic minorities may end up in ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods, and especially deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, 
not as a result of choice, but as a result of a lack of choice (van Ham & Manley, 2009). 
Prior to the work of Manley and van Ham (2011) and van Ham and Manley (2009), 
work assessing the impact of CBL on segregation has largely focussed on changes in the 
level  of  segregation  in  the  neighbourhoods  affected.  Work  for  the  Department  of 
Communities and Local Government (Pawson et al., 2006), and extended in Pawson and 
Watkins (2007), used a number of case studies from social housing estates and concluded that 
“there is no evidence that [CBL] has resulted in more ethnically polarized patterns of letting  
than those arising from previous lettings systems where decisions on which properties to 
offer to which applications were largely in the hands or landlord staff” (Pawson et al., 2006, 
p.14; see also Pawson & Watkins, 2007). In terms of ethnic mix in communities Pawson and 
colleagues found that “[m]any applicants preferred ethnically mixed areas, rather than areas 
where  one  ethnicity  predominated,  which  suggests  that  diffusion  is  more  likely  than 
segregation  under  CBL”  (2006,  p.183).  However,  measuring  a  change  in  neighbourhood 
segregation requires information on the outflow of households from neighbourhoods as well 
as the inflows. If the outflow of a neighbourhood was comprised solely of one ethnic group 
(such as in extreme cases of ‘white flight’) then the ultimate degree of segregation would be 
very different a neighbourhood in which an equal share of ethnic and non-ethnic minority 
individuals  were  leaving.  In  their  study,  Pawson  and  colleagues  (2006)  only  collected 
information about the households entering neighbourhoods (inflow) and not those households 
leaving  the  neighbourhoods.  As  such,  they  are  incorrect  to  conclude  that  under  CBL 
segregation is decreasing. The CBL process also requires that prospective tenants are willing 
and able to invest time into understanding the housing system that they are using and that 
they will make rational, normative decisions in their housing and neighbourhood choices.  
 
An English Case Study 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter builds on two papers (van Ham and Manley, 
2009; Manley and van Ham, 2011). Both of these papers use unique data from lettings made 
to tenants in social housing in England during the 2000s collected by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Each time a socially rented dwelling was let 
(either from a Housing Association or a Local Authority) a record was created. This record 
was stored as part of the CORE database (COntinuous REcording) and contained information 
on both the property and household. Legislation in England meant that all social landlords 
with more than 250 units or bed spaces were legally required to complete the CORE logs 
fully. In practice many landlords smaller than the regulation size also participated. Because of 
the comprehensive level of coverage, the CORE dataset can be treated as a Census of all 
social housing lettings made in England during any given year, and can be regarded as flow 
data  depicting  the  flows  of  households  into social  housing.  It  is  also  possible  to  include 
detailed  information  about  local  neighbourhoods  because  CORE  data  includes  low  level 
geocoding for each letting. This information includes neighbourhood characteristics such as 
the level of neighbourhood deprivation, or the proportion of the neighbourhood belonging to 
ethnic minority groups. 
  Van  Ham  and  Manley  (2009)  investigated  the  probability  that  ethnic  minority 
households  are  more  likely  to  enter  neighbourhoods  with  a  high  concentration  of  other 
members of ethnic minority groups. Neighbourhoods were defined using the administrative 
units Super Output Areas (SOAs). SOAs contain on average 1,500 people and were designed 
to  represent  ‘neighbourhoods’  for  the  publication  of  low  level  statistics  in  the  United 
Kingdom. Using the SOAs, neighbourhoods were classified using the proportion of ethnic 
minority residents, derived from the 2001 Population Census for England. The groups were: 
0 to 2.5%; 2.5 to 5%; 5 to 10%; 10 to 20%; 20 to 40% and 40 to 100%. The models were 
used to predict if an ethnic minority household was more likely to enter a neighbourhood 
with a high concentration of ethnic minorities than white households and whether or not that 
likelihood was increased when properties were let under CBL. The results of the analysis 
show that for ethnic minority households the most likely neighbourhood outcome is to enter 
in  a  neighbourhood  with  between  20-40%  of  the  population  also  belonging  to  an  ethnic 
minority. This outcome is more likely for ethnic minority residents using CBL than those 
using one of the other allocation systems. In all cases, ethnic minority households are more 
likely than white households to enter neighbourhoods with a high proportion of households 
also from ethnic minorities especially when using CBL. In comparison, the white population 
are most likely to enter neighbourhoods with 0-10% and 10-20% concentration of ethnic 
minorities, even when they move from neighbourhoods with higher concentrations of ethnic 
minorities. Unlike the ethnic minority  group, there are no differences in the probabilities 
between white households who use CBL and those using the other access routes.  
Manley and van Ham (2011) combine multiple years of CORE data to conduct two 
analyses. In the first analysis areas were matched where 100% of the lettings were made 
using CBL in 2008/2009 with the same areas in 1999/2000 (before CBL was introduced). 
This allowed the geography of the areas to be held constant and a direct pre-CBL to post-
CBL  comparison  made.  The  second  analysis  used  all  the  letting  data  from  2008/9  and 
analysed the flows of individuals using either CBL or non-CBL allocation routes in that year. 
The  dependent  variable  of  the  models  was  also  adjusted  to  combine  measures  of  ethnic 
concentration  and  neighbourhood  deprivation.  Neighbourhood  deprivation  was  measured 
using the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) for England (ODPM, 2007) and the 2001 
Census for the percentage of ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods. The first year for which 
the IMD data is available at the SOA level is 2004, As a result, the IMD 2004 was linked to 
the 1999/2000 data and the IMD 2007 to the 2008/9 data. Although the dates of the IMDs are 
not  identical  to  the  dates  of  the  lettings,  it  is  valid  to  use  deprivation  information  from 
different  time  periods  as  deprivation  is  largely  static  over  time  (see  Meen  et  al.,  2007). 
Innovatively,  instead  of  directly  using  the  national  absolute  measures  of  neighbourhood 
deprivation and ethnicity we created bespoke relative measures for local housing markets. Given that most households search locally, not nationally, for housing, we chose to create 
variables reflecting the  relative position of a neighbourhood in the local housing market. 
Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) were used to represent local housing markets. These areas are 
defined so that 75% of those living in the area also work in the area vice versa, meaning that 
they capture local housing search areas effectively (see Coombes & Raybould, 2004). 
The  outcome  variable  for  the  analysis  was  constructing  using  a  combination  of 
deprivation from the  Index of Multiple Deprivation and the proportion of the population 
identified as belong to an ethnic minority. In each case the 20 per cent most deprived Super 
Output  Areas  in  each  Travel  to  Work  Area  we  identified.  This  gave  a  bespoke  relative 
measure  of  neighbourhood  deprivation  and  ethnicity  for  each  housing  market. 
Neighbourhoods were classified into four groups for the dependent variable: (1) non-deprived 
and  White  concentration  neighbourhoods;  (2)  deprived  but  not  ethnic  concentration 
neighbourhoods;  (3)  non-deprived  but  ethnic  concentration  neighbourhoods,  and;  (4) 
deprived  and  ethnic  concentration  neighbourhoods.  These  four  categories  are  based  on 
research  which  shows  that  many  people  see  deprived  neighbourhoods  and  ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods as less desirable (Harris, 1999; Bolt et al., 2008). Manley and 
van  Ham  argued  that  these  four  types  of  neighbourhoods  can  act  as  a  proxy  for 
neighbourhood  desirability  within  local  housing  markets,  where  the  first  type  of 
neighbourhood is more desirable than the other three types (although there is no particular 
order  between  types  two,  three  or  four).  With  a  multinomial  response  variable  (with  4 
outcomes) and clear hierarchical structures within the data (local neighbourhoods as SOAs 
within TTWA housing markets) the most appropriate model was a  multinomial, multilevel 
model (see Manley and van Ham 2011 for details). 
The  results  of  the  analysis  are  presented  in  table  1.  For  both  the  comparative 
1999/2000  with  2008/2009  approach  and  the  cross  sectional  2008/2009  approach  ethnic 
minorities are consistently more likely to enter neighbourhoods with concentrations of other 
ethnic minorities and neighbourhoods that have a high level of deprivation. The table shows 
that, compared to the white population before the introduction of CBL (see the top half of the 
table) ethnic minorities are 1.29 times more likely to end up in deprived neighbourhoods, 
2.63 times more likely to end up in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods and 3.08 times more 
likely to end up in deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. After CBL, the sorting 
effects are stronger, with members of ethnic minorities 4.60 more likely to enter the same 
type of neighbourhood than the white population.  It is also notable that the white households 
using CBL are actually less likely than white households renting prior to the introduction of 
CBL to enter deprived and ethnic minority concentration neighbourhoods. Thus, there were 
strong sorting mechanisms present in the allocation of social housing prior to the introduction 
of CBL. After CBL had been introduced, this sorting pattern became more pronounced, with 
ethnic  minorities  4.6  times  more  likely  to  enter  deprived  and  ethnically  concentrated 
neighbourhoods  compared  with  white  households  prior  to  CBL.  It  is  notable  that  white 
households are less likely (0.9 times) to enter these neighbourhoods after the introduction of 
CBL compared with the same households before CBL. The bottom half of the table reports 
the  findings  of  the  analysis  post  CBL  and  a  similar  trend  can  be  seen.  Ethnic  minority 
households are more likely that White households to enter areas with higher concentrations of 
ethnic minorities as well as areas with higher level of deprivation. The ethnic minority groups 
are 1.5 times more likely than the White group to enter a deprived neighbourhood, 1.2 times 
more likely to enter an ethnic concentration neighbourhood and 1.6 times more likely to enter 
a neighbourhood with high levels of deprivation and ethnic concentration. The results also 
show  that  ethnic  minorities  using  CBL  are  far  more  likely  than  others  (including  ethnic 
minorities  using  the  other  allocation  mechanisms)  to  rent  a  dwelling  in  deprived 
neighbourhoods,  ethnic  concentration  neighbourhoods  and  especially  deprived  ethnic concentration  neighbourhoods.  Compared  to  those  renting  without  CBL,  ethnic  minority 
households  are  now  2.2  times  more  likely  than  the  White  group  to  enter  a  deprived 
neighbourhood, 1.7 times more likely to enter an ethnic concentration neighbourhood and 2.7 
times  more  likely  to  enter  a  neighbourhood  with  high  levels  of  deprivation  and  ethnic 
concentration than the White population. This demonstrates that there is a clear sorting of the 
population  through  social  housing  letting.  These  results  suggest  that  ethnic  segregation 
through CBL is not just the result of choice as ethnic minorities are also more likely to end up 
in  the  more  deprived  neighbourhoods,  even  when  these  are  not  ethnic  concentration 
neighbourhoods. We discuss this finding further in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Table 1: Total effects of ethnicity and choice-based letting (odds ratios),   




Deprived & Ethnic 
Concentration  
Total effects using data from 1999/2000 and 2008/9 for HA lettings in urban areas 
White before CBL  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Ethnic before CBL  1.29  2.63  3.08 
White after CBL  1.48  1.24  0.90 
Ethnic after CBL  2.10  4.05  4.60 
Total effects using data from 2008/9 for HA and LA lettings  
White, not using CBL  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Ethnic minority, not using CBL  1.59  1.24  1.60 
White, using CBL  1.19  1.07  1.13 
Ethnic minority, using CBL  2.20  1.70  2.68 
Source: Author’s own calculations using CORE and LACORE lettings data 1999/2000 & 
2008/9 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter has suggested that in order to understand residential segregation a number of 
literatures need to be brought together and that segregation analysis should focus on flows of 
households  into  neighbourhoods  rather  than  on  static  indices.  This  example  has  been 
illustrated  by  examining  the  flows  of  social  housing  tenants  and  has  demonstrated  the 
implications  that  these  flows  have  for  the  degree  to  which  socio-economic  and  more 
specifically ethnic segregation can occur. By combining literatures on housing choice and 
neighbourhood sorting we highlighted the likely outcomes of government policies introduce 
choice into the social housing market. Given the spatial fixity of housing – once located in a 
neighbourhood  a  property  cannot  be  moved,  and  changes  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
neighbourhood tend to occur slowly over time – understanding how households sort into 
dwellings  and  neighbourhoods  is  crucial  for  understanding  how  residential  segregation 
develops  and  is  maintained  over  time.  The  vast  majority  of  the  residential  segregation 
literature  tends  to  assume  that  households  are  able  to  exercise  choice  and  do  not  face 
substantial spatial constraints. When turning the discussion to the social housing sector, the 
third  of  the  literatures,  the  debate  must  be  refocused  and  the  limited  number  of  options 
recognised.  When  discussing  the  social  housing  sector  choice  becomes  a  much  more 
restricted good and the potential for prospective tenants to use choice to subvert the social 
housing allocation system and in a non-rational manner increases. No longer does choice 
become  about  exercising  a  preferred  option  among  a  range  of  distinct  alternatives  but  it 
becomes more about satisfying other, more immediate housing needs. In contrast to the CLG sponsored research (see CLG, 2006; Pawson and Watkins, 
2007) which was based on a limited number of early CBL case studies we argue that the 
process of CBL is contributing to, at best, a stabilising of segregation levels across social 
housing  communities  or  at  worst  an  increase  in  segregation.  Based  on  the  two  analyses 
presented above we draw three conclusions about the structure of social housing allocations 
and the potential of that sector to create segregated communities. The first conclusion is that 
among those who do not use CBL, ethnic minority households are far more likely than White 
households to enter deprived and especially ethnic-concentration neighbourhoods. In other 
words,  there  are  differences  in  households  and  letting  structures  differences  that  lead  to 
differential outcomes for ethnic and White tenants even when choice is not exercised through 
choice based lettings. The second conclusion is that those who rent their dwelling using CBL 
(both non-minority and ethnic minority households) are more likely to end up in a deprived 
neighbourhood (and to a lesser extent in an ethnic-concentration neighbourhood) than those 
who get their dwelling using the older allocation systems. This is borne out by the analyses 
presented  in  both  van  Ham  and  Manley  (2009)  and  Manley  and  van  Ham  (2011)  using 
multiple years worth of data and multiple analytical methods. It is likely that this is partly a 
function of the neighbourhoods in which CBL has been rolled out in the initial phases of the 
policy development. CBL was used primarily as a means to stimulate demand in areas that 
had traditionally been harder for landlords to let. As such it was less of a vehicle to promote 
real  choice  for  prospective  tenants  by  providing  desirable  residential  alternatives  for 
households looking for properties to choose from and more a means to stimulate demand. 
The third and final conclusion is that ethnic minorities renting through CBL are much more 
likely to end up in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods than any other group. This is clear 
evidence of a sorting process in social housing, and one that could lead to higher levels of 
segregation. This outcome is in stark contrast to Pawson and Watkins (2007) and fits with the 
theoretical  and  empirical  literature  of  housing  and  neighbourhood  choice  (see  Schelling, 
1971; Clark, 1991). 
Our overall conclusion is that allocation mechanism for social housing will always 
lead to sorting simply because they act as bureaucratic gate keepers to a restricted resource. 
However, that there are sorting differences amongst ethnic minority and White households 
even when other socio-economic factors are taken into account is potentially worrying if the 
sorting  mechanisms  are  leading  to  and  reproducing  spatial  disadvantage.  One  aspect  of 
segregation which this chapter has deliberately not commented on or analysed is how the 
level of segregation in neighbourhoods has changed after the introduction of CBL. To do so 
would  require  information  about  the  outflow  and  well  as  the  inflow  of  individuals. 
Nevertheless, the fact that ethnic minorities using CBL are not only the most likely to end up 
in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, but also in deprived neighbourhoods suggests that 
the selective sorting is not only a result of choice and self-segregation, but also a result of a 
lack of real choice. Part of this lack of real choice seems to be structural: CBL has, to date, 
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